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I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration law is notoriously unique. And in today’s political climate,
it is far too easy to forget that immigration law is administrative law. A
hierarchy of administrative agencies adjudicate immigration cases, but unlike
other agencies, the appeals process looks quite different for immigration
proceedings. Regardless, as an administrative system, every landmark
Supreme Court case affecting administrative law, like Kisor v. Wilkie,1
necessarily welcomes change to immigration law. However, judicial
deference in immigration is controversial as an astonishing number of
appeals are decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals—the executive
agency responsible for answering some of our nation’s most hotly-contested
issues.
Since its grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the administrative law
community had eagerly awaited the outcome of Kisor v. Wilkie.2 The Court
revisited the scope of Auer3 deference—sometimes referred to as Seminole
Rock4 deference—which for decades has guided courts to give broad
deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of their own
ambiguous regulations so long as they were not plainly inconsistent with the

1.
2.
3.
4.

Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
Id.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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text.5 Not all have been thrilled with Auer’s tenure.6 Some critics opined
that Auer granted administrative agencies too much power.7 Ironically, the
late Justice Scalia, author of the Auer decision, believed it was time for the
Court to review its decision.8 Others believed it severely undermined
courts’ authority to conduct hearings and form their own judgments.9
Regardless of their various reasons for opposing Auer, critics had this much
in common—Kisor should finally lay the decades-old policy to rest.10
Conversely, some legal scholars passionately supported Auer for allowing
administrative agencies to make decisions according to their well-founded
expertise.11 Supporters lauded the doctrine for being tried and true,
attacking criticism as mere speculation.12 Some claimed keeping Auer as
the foundation for regulatory interpretation is crucial for preventing the
inevitable parade of constitutional arguments against administrative laws.13
For Auer supporters, Kisor was an opportunity to maintain the status quo
5. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2405 (“Under [the Auer] doctrine, this Court has long deferred to an
agency’s reasonable reading of its own genuinely ambiguous regulations.”).
6. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Elizabeth H. Slattery, The World After Seminole Rock and Auer,
42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 625, 626–27 (2019) (advocating the Court seize the opportunity in Kisor
to “retire” Seminole Rock deference).
7. Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, K., concurring)
(providing the vehement criticism of The Honorable Judge Kent A. Jordan of the Third Circuit that
Auer “spread the spores of the ever-expanding administrative state”).
8. See Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–17 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the “unnatural” interpretation of an EPA regulation on the basis of Auer).
9. See Mark Chenoweth, Chief Justice Roberts Is Dead Wrong About Auer Deference, FORBES (Jun. 30,
2019, 3:20 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/markchenoweth/2019/06/30/chief-justice-robertsis-dead-wrong-about-auer-deference/#37882ccc5c67
[https://perma.cc/CAD6-ZZ87]
(“Auer
deference stands for the idea that judges must defer to federal agencies when interpreting those
agencies’ regulations[.]”).
10. See Larkin & Slattery, supra note 6, at 626–27 (“In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court has an
opportunity this Term to correct its mistake in Seminole Rock. It should.”).
11. See Daniel E. Walters, The Empty Case for Overruling Auer Deference, THE REG. REV. (Dec. 11,
2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/12/11/walters-empty-case-overruling-auer-deference/
[https://perma.cc/9S5D-3EE4] (complimenting Auer deference for giving agencies confidence in
their “good faith [statutory] interpretations”).
12. See Ronald M. Levin, Auer and the Incentives Issue, YALE J. ON REG. (Sept. 19, 2016)
http://yalejreg.com/nc/auer-and-the-incentives-issue-by-ronald-m-levin/ [https://perma.cc/3C6ZWBT9] (hailing Auer, older than the Administrative Procedure Act itself, as a “venerable doctrine”);
see also Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm, supra note 11, at 92 (reporting Auer deference did not
encourage agencies to purposefully create ambiguous regulations in hopes of being afforded blind
deference from the courts).
13. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 299 (2017) (insisting the use of “heavy constitutional artillery” would lead to
the dismantling of numerous federal agencies).
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and leave administrative agencies responsible for interpreting their own
rules.
Ultimately, it was the Auer loyalists who had cause to celebrate.14
However, this victory was not unconditional.15 That Court took the
opportunity to “reinforce [Auer’s] limits” and qualify when deference is to
be granted or denied.16 In her opinion, Justice Kagan gave a sobering
reminder: “The deference doctrine we describe is potent in its place, but
cabined in its scope.”17 Ultimately, the Kisor decision reinforces Auer’s
limits so much that some say it has been thoroughly “gut[ted].”18
The heated discussion surrounding Kisor was not unwarranted. Simply
put, administrative law is a vast area of law that affects all those within the
country.19 On that same note, administrative law also impacts those who
wish to enter the country.20
This Comment will discuss judicial deference as applied to immigration
law before and after Kisor. Part II will review the history of administrative
law in the United States and how it has expanded over several decades.
Part III will briefly summarize the structure of immigration law and how it
has historically limited judicial review. Part IV will summarize Kisor—its
factual background, arguments by its parties, and holding. Following the
discussion of Kisor, Part V of this Comment will assess the implications of
its holding on the large, crucial area of administrative law that is
immigration, particularly regarding the Attorney General’s certification
review powers and recently promulgated regulations. This Comment will
draw comparisons between Chevron and Auer in the review of judicial
deference trends in immigration. Further, though controversial, Kisor serves
as an important tool for the circuit courts to consistently adjudicate
immigration decisions and limit deference granted to the executive branch.
This Comment predicts that Kisor’s holding will bring Auer deference to
the forefront of judicial deference doctrines—welcoming an influx of Auer
14. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408 (affirming Auer deference).
15. Id..
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. William Yeatman, The Auer Doctrine Suffers Pyrrhic Victory in Kisor v. Wilkie, CATO INST.
(June 27, 2019, 10:39 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/auer-doctrine-suffers-pyrrhic-victory-kisor-vwilkie [https://perma.cc/ZQ4E-5CFA].
19. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1–2 (3d ed. 2014).
20. Department of Justice, Organizational Chart, https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart
[https://perma.cc/ZN4E-BJNY] (providing immigration cases that are adjudicated by the Department
of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review).
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challenges to the federal courts. Further, it is expected that the federal
courts will defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Attorney
General less frequently now that Kisor has reinforced Auer’s limits.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A PRIMER
The state of current administrative law is far from what was conceivable
at its inception in the eighteenth century.21 Today, regulations are overseen,
executed, and adjudicated through a complex web of executive departments
and independent commissions.22
As famously described by Justice Breyer, administrative agencies are
“quasi legislative and quasi adjudicative,” but never to be confused for being
either in totality.23 Legislative agencies’ powers are delegated and restricted
by Congress.24 The non-delegation doctrine generally prevents Congress
from divesting itself of its legislative power.25 Moreover, the checks-andbalances system of our government intends to prevent agencies from
becoming a “fourth branch of government,” though whether this has been
accomplished has been a point of contention over the course of several
decades.26 This conversation is especially prevalent in immigration law due
to immigration law’s separation from “mainstream constitutional norms.”27

21. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 582 (1984) (explaining the Founders’ goal of maintaining “a handful of cabinet
departments” to help efficiently run the government).
22. Id. at 584 (providing a list, created by Strauss, of several examples of how regulations are
administered⎯including the Department of Labor’s oversight of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), an executive agency, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, an independent commission).
23. Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 774 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
24. See Strauss, supra note 21, at 581–82 (providing a brief of the governmental origins and
structure of administrative agencies).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States[.]”).
26. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1952) (“[Administrative
bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our threebranch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional
thinking.”) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
27. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 583, 584 (2017); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1990) (coining the term
“subconstitutional immigration law” in reference to the “interpretation . . . of [immigration] statutes,
regulations, administrative guidelines, and the like”).
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III. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN IMMIGRATION CASES
Immigration law involves a complex interaction across various
administrative executive agencies, including the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS).28 This Comment focuses on the DOJ, led
by the Attorney General, which handles the adjudication of immigration
removal proceedings.29 Within the DOJ is the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), which employs Immigration Judges (IJs) to
interpret and adjudicate removal proceedings pursuant to the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).30
The CFR, promulgated by the Attorney General, entrusts the power to
answer interpretative issues with him or herself.31 Within the EOIR, IJs
serve as extensions of the Attorney General and issue final decisions on his
or her behalf.32
The EOIR’s appellate body is the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or
the Board), which consists of twenty-one attorneys, appointed by the
Attorney General “to act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases
that come before them.”33 As an appellate body, the BIA’s purpose is to
“provide clear and uniform guidance” of immigration laws.34
The CFR delegates the BIA power to act in accordance with the INA “as
is appropriate and necessary” for a case on review.35 If the Board wishes
to create binding precedent on meanings of “laws, regulations, or
procedures,” the Code allows for panel decisions, which are adjudicated by
three members.36 These panel decisions are also used in other
circumstances, including addressing inconsistencies and reviewing “clearly
erroneous factual determination[s] by . . . Immigration Judges.”37
28. See Department of Justice, Organizational Chart, https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart
[https://perma.cc/ZN4E-BJNY] (providing a visual aid depicting the hierarchy within the DOJ).
29. See id. (depicting the organizational structure of the DOJ, headed by the Attorney General).
30. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1701 (2019).
31. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2019) (expressing the Attorney General’s duties and power to
delegate power to the DOJ); Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee
Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 138 (2019).
32. Martin S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process Rights While Preserving the
BIA’s Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 284 (2007).
33. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2019).
34. Id. § 1003.1(d)(1).
35. Id. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).
36. Id. § 1003.1(a)(3). The significance of these panel decisions will be discussed further infra.
37. Id. § 1003.1(e)(6)(i)–(v).
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Historically, the general trend among federal courts has been to afford
great deference to agents within the DOJ.38 Immigration cases reviewable
by the federal Courts of Appeals were significantly limited by the enactment
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA or the Act).39 The IIRIRA is largely responsible for how the
country adjudicates immigration cases today.40 Foremost, the Act boosted
the status of IJs from “special inquiry officer[s]” within Immigration
Naturalization Services (INS) to administrative judges within EOIR.41
Additionally, the IIRIRA combined exclusion proceedings with deportation
proceedings to form what are now known as “removal proceedings.”42 The
IIRIRA is also to thank for expedited removal proceedings for respondents
lacking the “credible fear” necessary to seek asylum.43 Strikingly, Article III
courts were barred from reviewing denials of discretionary relief, granting
IJs more discretion than ever.44 The amendments made to the INA were—
and still are—controversial for significantly altering immigration
procedures.45 The degree to which the IIRIRA divested the circuit courts
38. See, e.g., Chen v. I.N.S., 87 F.3d 5, 7–8 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming the BIA’s ability to exercise
“independent review” of an Immigration Judge’s findings without elaborate explanation, in accordance
with the “administrative appeal” of immigration law).
39. See generally Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1242)
(modifying definitions in the INA and limiting judicial review of immigration cases); see also M. Isabel
Medina, Judicial Review—A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1557–60 (1997) (narrating the appellate
procedure of immigration cases before and after the IIRIRA).
40. See Edward R. Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences: IIRIRA and Other Unsung Contributors to the
Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. 923, 926–27 (2006) (listing the measures in which
the IIRIRA changed the immigration system).
41. Id. at 938; Krezalek, supra note 32, at 283 (evidencing the INS⎯which is now known as
DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP)⎯was partitioned into several agencies in response to the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001).
42. See Grant, supra note 40, at 927 (listing the measures in which the IIRIRA changed the
immigration system).
43. Id. at 933 (evidencing expedited removal was created to allow for more efficiency because
a respondent “could be ordered removed without a hearing . . . thus clearing judges’ dockets of
numerous and essentially uncontested matters”).
44. See Medina, supra note 39, at 1526 (asserting the executive branch’s dominance in postIIRIRA immigration proceedings “upset [the constitutional balance preserved by the separation of
powers principle] to an untenable degree”).
45. See, e.g., Eleanor Acer & Olga Byrne, How the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 Has Undermined US Refugee Protection Obligations and Wasted Government Resources,
5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 356 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/233
150241700500207 (criticizing the IIRIRA for imposing substantial burdens on applying for asylum and
contributing to a “record high” backlog of immigration cases).
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has been criticized as an “attempt[] to eliminate Article III review of agency
decisions” under several types of immigration cases.46 Arguably, such
divestment is more than the traditional level of deference granted to an
executive agency.
In 2005, Congress introduced the REAL ID Act, which similarly limited
the types of cases reviewable by federal courts.47 The REAL ID Act was
enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in I.N.S v. St. Cyr,48
which held Article III courts had jurisdiction to rule on legal issues for the
respondent’s petition for habeas corpus without any limitations from the
IIRIRA or Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).49
The Court, after thorough analysis of legislative intent, determined the INS
failed to “overcome . . . the strong presumption in favor of judicial review
of administrative action.”50 The REAL ID Act not-so subtly disagreed with
the Court’s holding in St. Cyr.51 However, the REAL ID Act compromised
by allowing judicial courts to review: (i) the constitutionality of a statute or
regulation, or (ii) the legality of the Attorney General’s decisions.52
A. Criticisms
The Legislature has gone to great lengths to protect the level of deference
granted to immigration agencies.53 The BIA’s discretion was even once
described as “unfettered at the outset.”54 Some scholars speculate this level

46. Medina, supra note 39, at 1525.
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005).
48. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
49. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–32, 110 Stat. 1214; see
also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Div. of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 9
(1st Cir. 2007) (“[Through enacting the REAL ID Act,] Congress plainly intended to put an end to the
scattershot and piecemeal nature of the review process that previously had held sway in regard to
removal proceedings.”); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314.
50. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314.
51. Krezalek, supra note 32, at 286–87 (describing the REAL ID Act provision withholding
jurisdiction from habeas corpus review as a “direct response” to St. Cyr); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 327
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (absconding the Court for “find[ing] ambiguity in the utterly clear language of a
statute” that restricts all courts’ power to review issues of respondents “found deportable by reason of
their criminal acts”).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
53. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999)
(“Of course many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the
courts—indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.”).
54. I.N.S. v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996).
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of congressional deference given to the BIA is especially worrisome.55
Furthermore, immigration law has a reputation for being prosecutorial in
nature, in contrast to other administrative law forums.56 This raises special
concerns as to whether deference should truly be so broad.57 Also, consider
the structural makeup of the DOJ and its sub-agencies; the same regulations
that grant authorities to the Attorney General are created by the Attorney
General.58 One need not be a constitutional law aficionado to question
whether such power is appropriate in our checks-and-balances system.
Nevertheless, such concerns have historically had little sway.59
Likewise, before Kisor, Auer deference was controversial for bestowing
“reflexive” deference to agencies with little analysis.60 Statistics tend to
portray Auer as the most generous judicial deference doctrine, calling into
question whether deference was truly warranted in the ninety percent of
cases Auer was granted in.61 The following summary is Kisor’s response to
those concerns.
IV. KISOR V. WILKIE
The concept of regulatory deference did not originate in Auer. The
doctrine first appeared in Seminole Rock, which Auer affirmed two decades
later.62 Auer adopted the “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” language from
55. E.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The type
of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is troubling. And when deference is applied to
other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation of the statutory
provisions that concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still.”).
56. Cf. Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum
Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 826–27 (2018) (“Although a deterrence strategy
might be permissible in the criminal justice system, courts have made clear that it may not motivate the
civil immigration system.”).
57. See Sweeney, supra note 31, at 138 (“Former BIA Member Lory Rosenberg regards these
twin powers as giving the Attorney General ‘an exclusive level of authority over the course of
immigration law and policy[.]’”).
58. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2000) (outlining the rights and duties of the Attorney General
under immigration law).
59. See, e.g., Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
Attorney General’s authority to promulgate streamlining regulations pursuant to his “broad
discretion . . . to fashion the procedures of the BIA”).
60. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
61. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (comparing the percentages of cases in which agencies prevailed
under different judicial deference doctrines, with Auer being granted the most).
62. Larkin & Slattery, supra note 6, at 625.
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Seminole Rock, but Auer went further to say that an agency interpretation can
be found in unexpected places—like an amicus brief—so long as it reflected
the agency’s “fair and considered judgment.”63 Since Auer, federal courts
have invoked the doctrine when deciding whether to defer to an agency’s
regulatory interpretation.
A. Factual Background of Kisor
Kisor began as a suit between Kisor, a Vietnam War veteran, and the
Department of Veteran Affairs (VA), after the VA denied him PTSD
benefits for the time he requested.64 The Board of Veteran’s Appeals (the
Board) interpreted the VA’s regulations to only “grant Kisor retroactive
benefits if it found there were ‘relevant official service department records’”
unconsidered in the first suit.65 Finding Kisor’s new records irrelevant to
the initial denial, the Board affirmed the VA’s decision.66 The Board’s
decision was again affirmed by the Court of Appeals for Veteran’s Claims,
“an independent Article I court that initially reviews the Board’s
decisions.”67
The Federal Circuit deferred to the Board’s interpretation, describing the
VA’s regulation “ambiguous” as to whether “relevant” records must
support the agency’s reasons for denial or the veteran’s claim in its
entirety.68 Applying Auer deference, the Federal Circuit reasoned the VA’s
own construction of its own regulation was not “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the VA’s regulatory framework.”69 This action inspired
Kisor to file for certiorari and pray the Supreme Court overrule Auer.70
B. Arguments Presented
Kisor’s argument in favor of overruling Auer and Seminole Rock was largely
policy-based. Primarily, Kisor challenged Auer for allowing agencies to have
“expansive, unreviewable lawmaking authority.”71 According to Kisor,

63. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414; Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
64. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409.
71. Brief for Petitioner at 25, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18–15),
2019 WL 338890.
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Auer should not have survived Congress’s enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), which mandated the “procedural checks on agency
rulemaking” known as “notice-and-comment.”72 Generally, “notice-andcomment” requires agencies to publish their proposed rules in the Federal
Register.73 Following the publication, “interested persons” are allowed to
comment on the rule by submitting “data, views, or arguments.”74 Agencies
are allowed to incorporate the rule with a “general statement of their basis
and purpose” only after this procedure75 Kisor argued Auer allowed
agencies to issue binding interpretations without enduring “notice-andcomment,” “thus gut[ting] . . . the heart of the APA.”76 Kisor additionally
contended that allowing an agency’s regulatory interpretation to become
binding contravened other Court rulings precluding deference to
interpretive rules.77 Further, Kisor boldly argued that Auer deference
contradicted the government’s separation-of-powers system, analogizing
Congress’s limitation from interpreting its own enactments to support the
conclusion that agencies should not interpret their own rules.78
The Respondent took a practical approach in support of Seminole Rock
and Auer. Rather than generally advocating for Auer deference as it has
existed, the Solicitor General agreed the doctrine contained flaws and thus
requested the Court to limit Auer to “certain prerequisites,” many of which
were used for Chevron79 deference.80 The Respondent argued that “more
drastic changes” to judicial deference and the APA should be left to
Congress. Further, the Respondent raised stare decisis as another defense
to overruling Seminole Rock.81

72. Id.
73. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (1966).
74. Id. § 553(c).
75. Id.
76. Brief for Petitioner at 30.
77. Id. at 31–33 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding interpretive
rules “enjoy no Chevron status as a class”).
78. Id. at 43–45.
79. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80. See Brief for Respondent at 27, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18–25), 2019
WL 929000 (arguing “[b]ecause Seminole Rock does not clearly flow from pre-APA history or the APA,”
Auer deference should be subject to limitations similar to those imposed by the Court for Chevron).
81. Id. at 35.
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C. The “New” Auer Deference
Indeed, the Court remained convinced Auer was a necessary part of
administrative law.82 But to quell the fears of its opposers—that the
administrative state would reign as an unsupervised “fourth branch” of our
federalist system—the Court reinforced Auer’s limits.83 After the reviewing
court “exhaust[s] all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction,” an agency
regulation must be found to be “genuinely ambiguous.”84 At first blush,
this step sounds simple enough. But determining the genuine ambiguity of
a regulation first requires a thorough inquiry into “the text, structure,
history, and purpose of a regulation.”85 The Court reassured this is not a
“rigid test,” but simply a variety of factors to be considered.86 Additionally,
the interpretation must be reasonable or “within the zone of ambiguity”
remaining after the textual, historical, and structural inquiry.87 Still,
reasonableness does not guarantee Auer deference; the agency must deserve
deference.88 This in itself requires yet another inquiry: whether the
interpretation was an actual position taken by the agency versus an “ad hoc
statement.”89 Once an official position is found, courts must determine the
interpretation falls within the purview of the agency’s special expertise.90
Even then, certain provisions may be found to be more appropriately
handled by an Article III judge.91
The Auer analysis does not end there. An agency’s interpretation must
“reflect ‘fair and considered judgment’” and cannot create “unfair surprise”

82. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2423 (holding despite changes to the administrative state since Seminole
Rock, administrative agencies should still “have leeway to say what [ambiguous terms] mean”).
83. See id. at 2414–18 (delineating criteria that must first be satisfied before affording agencies
Auer deference).
84. Id. at 2415.
85. Id. (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)); see Kisor, 139 S. Ct.
at 2415 (providing the optimistic continuation of Justice Kagan that this “careful consider[ation]” will
settle many ambiguities before Auer deference is needed).
86. Id. at 2414.
87. Id. at 2416.
88. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
89. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257–59 (2001)) (clarifying this official
position must “at the least emanate” from official actors, if not from the heads themselves).
90. Id. at 2417.
91. See id. (suggesting questions regarding common-law property, attorneys’ fees, or judicial
review should be answered by a judge).
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to the litigating parties.92 In the end, what appeared to be a simple rule on
its face is indeed a multi-factor test, which should comfort its detractors.93
D. The Court’s Reasoning
Deciding whether to retire Auer deference was no easy decision for the
Court; Auer was upheld with five votes—one of which was the Chief
Justice’s vote based solely on stare decisis.94 Though it was a close decision,
the Court upheld Auer deference for several reasons, dismantling each of
Kisor’s arguments:
First, Auer deference did not conflict with the APA because of the
numerous steps a court must take before deferring.95 On the contrary, the
Court concluded it was actually consistent with the APA.96 The absence of
a notice-and-comment procedure for interpretive rules was rendered
harmless because the federal courts reserve the ultimate approval of the
agency’s interpretation.97
Next, any claim that Auer infringes upon separation-of-powers was
determined to be misplaced. The Court rationalized that an agency’s blend
of legislative and judicial powers is ultimately an executive power that has
been permissible since our government’s origins.98 Additionally, without a
compelling reason against it, stare decisis controls.99 The history of
precedent relying on Seminole Rock and Auer was believed far too great to
overrule each one.100 The Court confidently added that even if its rationale
was wrong, Congress could always overrule the doctrines by revising the

92. Id. at 2418 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012),
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007)).
93. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (“What emerges is a deference doctrine not quite so tame as
some might hope, but not nearly so menacing as they might fear.”).
94. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
95. See id. at 2419 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 29, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)
(No. 18-15), 338890) (reemphasizing the procedure of “meaningful judicial review”).
96. See id. at 2420 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2020)) (reasoning Auer deference assists courts in their
duty to “determine the meaning” of a rule by pointing out that Seminole Rock is older than the APA
itself).
97. Id. at 2421.
98. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (citing City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304–05 (2013)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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APA.101 Regardless of how much the administrative state had changed, the
Court held Auer stood the test of time for good reason.102
V. KISOR AND IMMIGRATION: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
As stated in Kisor, Auer deference is intended to “ensure consistency in
federal regulatory law.”103 In response to Auer skeptics, Justice Kagan
humorously questioned whether there is “anything to be said for courts all
over the country trying to figure out what makes for a new active
moiety?”104 Indeed, it is hard to fight the notion that delegating the duty
of interpreting agency regulations to Article III judges would inevitably lead
to “piecemeal” litigation and inconsistent results—at least when it comes to
active moieties.105 But immigration law presents its own unique challenges,
and Kisor is largely silent on the matter.106 Now that Kisor is controlling
precedent in administrative law appeals—and consequently, immigration
appeals to the BIA—Kisor will be the case of choice for judicial review of
the BIA’s regulatory interpretations.107
A. Auer and the BIA Streamlining System
In 1999, in the midst of the drastic changes to immigration proceedings,
the DOJ introduced amendments to the BIA’s appellate review process,
101. Id. at 2422–23.
102. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2423 (lauding how Auer deference has withstood Congress’ secondguessing “for approaching a century”).
103. Id. at 2414.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2413–14 (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)).
106. See generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (failing to include a discussion of BIA
interpretations); Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2449 n.3 (citing one immigration case, amongst over a dozen in
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, within a footnote to demonstrate the large volume of pre-Auer
decisions applying Seminole Rock deference).
107. For example, before Kisor, the Sixth Circuit questioned whether Pereira v. Sessions implied
the BIA’s interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) is undeserving of deference, but the court ultimately
decided to defer. See Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 313–14 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441, 445 (BIA 2018)) (noting regulations dictating the contents
of a “charging document” are ambiguous because they do not “specify the time and date of the initial
hearing before jurisdiction will vest”); see also Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161
(9th Cir. 2019)) (agreeing the BIA deserved “‘substantial deference’” for its interpretation of its own
regulation in Bermudez-Cota). But see United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 366 (4th Cir. 2019)
(disagreeing any ambiguity existed by stating “the regulations . . . unambiguously do create a dichotomy
between the notice that must be given to a noncitizen under statutory § 1229(a) and the information
that must be provided to an immigration court to commence proceedings under regulatory
§ 1003.14(a)”).
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known as “streamlining.”108 In response to the “enormous and
unprecedented” backlog of cases presented to the BIA, the DOJ proposed
single-member affirmances without opinion (AWOs) and AWOs by panel’s
when “appropriate.”109 Appropriate circumstances included, among
others, cases based on the BIA’s precedent “where there is no basis for
overruling the precedent” or precedent of certain Article III courts.110
Three-member panel decisions were to be reserved for cases at reasonable
risk of reversible error.111
In 2002, regulations were amended to bolster the use of AWOs.112 What
was once used at the BIA’s discretion became mandatory where: the
“decision under review was correct”; only “harmless or nonmaterial” errors
occurred, if any; the issue could be absolved by existing precedent.113 The
2002 promulgation reinforced that “there is no statutory right or law
requiring a particular form of decision or method of review before the
BIA.”114
The streamlining system is unsurprisingly subject to criticism.115 The
streamlining procedure not only affected how deportation procedures were
argued by respondents’ attorneys but also encouraged attorneys to
“reflexively file petitions for review.”116 Indeed, statistics showed a spike
in BIA appeals in all circuit courts, which began after the amendments in
108. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining,
64 Fed. Reg. 56135, 56138 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)) (Oct. 18, 1999) [hereinafter
Streamlining] (evidencing the streamlining procedure also settled a circuit split as to whether Due
Process required the BIA to explain their reasons for a decision adequately).
109. Id. at 56135–36 (establishing an AWO consists of a signed affirmance without further
explanation).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management,
67 Fed. Reg. 54878 (Aug. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Procedural Reforms] (amending streamlining
procedures).
113. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel
Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 84 Fed. Reg. 31463, 31464 (codified
at 8 C.F.R. 1003, 1292) (July 2, 2019) [hereinafter Affirmance Without Opinion] (comparing
8 C.F.R. 3.1(a)(7)(ii) (instructing that a single BIA member “may” issue an AWO) with
8 C.F.R. 1003.1(e)(4) (2003) (instructing that a single BIA member “shall” issue an AWO under certain
circumstances)).
114. Id. at 31465 (citing Procedural Reforms, supra note 112, at 54883, 54888–90).
115. John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People
Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge
in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 87 (2005).
116. See id. (observing respondents adapted to “fight[ing] tooth and nail on every legal issue”
due to the high stakes of removal proceedings and little chance for judicial review).
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2002 were promulgated.117 Most astonishing are the numbers reported by
the Ninth Circuit in 2004: the court witnessed a “560% increase in
immigration appeals since 2001” and nearly half of its docket consisted of
only immigration cases.118
Like prior attempts at expanding immigration agency authority, the
streamlining rule heard constitutional objections.119 In response to
concerned comments, the DOJ’s rationalization boiled down to the need
for efficiency considering the staggering caseload presented to a board of
twenty-one members.120 Threats to due process were determined to be
rare and, for the most part, the DOJ argued constitutional rights would be
Particularly, the
protected by existing procedural guidelines.121
streamlining process protected due process because it still allowed
respondents’ cases to be heard by an IJ and to “present arguments to the
BIA.”122 Thus, IJs issue final agency orders, which are only reviewable
based on whether the IJ correctly applied a statute.123 Still, some
commentators predicted the inevitability of inconsistent results and
administrative inefficiency.124
B. The Final Rule
A new regulation promulgated by EOIR appears to preemptively protect
the BIA from Kisor scrutiny by broadening the definition of the agency’s fair
and considered judgment. However, this effort will likely prove ineffective.
In response to the EOIR’s enormous backlog, the DOJ published a
proposed regulatory change to “amend the Department of Justice
(Department) regulations regarding the administrative review procedures of

117. Michael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining Reforms
and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 999, 1001–02 (2006).
118. Id. at 1002.
119. See Streamlining, supra note 108, at 56137 (summarizing comments on the proposed rule,
including citations to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
120. Id. at 56136.
121. Id. at 56138.
122. Drew Marksity, Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: Federal Appellate Review of Board of
Immigration Appeals Streamlining Procedure, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 655–56 (2008); see Affirmance Without
Opinion, supra note 113 (citing circuit court cases affirming “that respondents have no constitutional
or statutory right to a particular form or manner of a BIA decision”).
123. Marksity, supra note 122, at 655.
124. See Palmer, supra note 115, at 30–31 (2005) (discussing various criticisms against singe
member decisions, including more chance for error, inconsistent opinions, and diminished credibility).
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the [BIA],” just days after the Court issued Kisor.125 This proposal, known
as the “final rule” intended to:
(i) Promote single-member written opinions instead of AWOs when
reviewing IJ decisions;126
(ii) Employ panel decisions for “complex, novel, unusual, or recurring
issue[s] of law or fact”;127
(iii) If passed by a majority vote of permanent BIA members, permit
panel decisions to become precedential.128
The DOJ explained the Final Rule is intended to “secur[e] finality in
immigration cases” or in other words, minimize the overwhelming number
of appeals brought before the BIA.129 A similar effort was first proposed
in 2008, suggesting panel decisions could become precedential through
panel members’ votes.130
This was suggested in response to the Board’s concern that not enough
precedent could be issued due to the vast majority of cases resolving
through AWO or panel decision.131 With more precedent, the proposal
suggested, the BIA and the Attorney General could “reclaim” the Chevron
deference to which it was entitled.132 Particularly in light of United States
v. Mead,133 which held Chevron cannot be applied to statutory interpretations
lacking the force of law, precedent was thought essential to “promote
national uniformity and obtain Chevron deference for the Board’s
interpretive decisions.”134
The Final Rule found the current system satisfactory; thus, the DOJ
decided not to allow three-member panels to establish their own

125. Affirmance Without Opinion, supra note 113, at 31463.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 31468.
129. Id. at 31464.
130. Id. at 34659–60.
131. See id. (stating the importance of issuing precedent for encouraging consistent IJ decisions).
132. Id. at 34661.
133. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
134. Affirmance Without Opinion, supra note 113, at 34660 (citing Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
at 226–27 (2001)).
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precedent.135 This may have been because the original proposal received
nationwide opposition.136 Despite this, the Final Rule maintained the
mandatory use of AWOs⎯thus indicating the EOIR choice to forego the
three-member vote method of establishing precedent does not mean the
agency is no longer concerned with receiving appropriate judicial deference.
The Final Rule states:
As discussed above, the Attorney General expects that the BIA will continue
to exercise its authority to issue precedent decisions as widely as is practicable
to promote the consistency and uniformity of adjudications and to provide
authoritative nationwide guidance to the immigration judges . . . and the
federal courts with respect to the interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the immigration
statutes and regulations . . . .137

Oddly, the EOIR chose not to adopt the amendment most likely to
effectively garner more precedential weight for panel decisions while still
adhering to the use of single-member, unwritten decisions.138 However, it
is precisely the use of AWOs that garners criticism for failing to provide
guidance and resulting in inconsistencies.139 After all, the federal courts
have already recognized that single-member decisions do not warrant
judicial deference.140 Understandably, the overwhelmingly large caseload
demanded the use of “abbreviated order[s],”141 but the reviewing courts

135. See Affirmance Without Opinion, supra note 113, at 31468 (electing to maintain “the
process of a majority vote of permanent members of the BIA and not, as initially proposed, by majority
vote of the permanent BIA members assigned to a three-member panel”).
136. See Am. Immigr. L. Found., Re: Comments on Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without
Opinion, Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents; EOIR Docket No. 159P, 12
(Aug. 18, 2008), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/general_litigation/
BIAAWO-regcmts.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2JL-8Z7F] (challenging the proposed rule and
dismantling EOIR’s argument that reclaiming Chevron is necessary).
137. See Affirmance Without Opinion, supra note 113, at 31469 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 31468.
139. See Marksity, supra note 122, at 658 (describing “the complexity that can arise for appeals
courts when trying to balance deference to agencies with the party’s right to receive a just hearing” in
immigration appeals pertaining to single member opinions and AWOs).
140. See Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 524–25 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding an unwritten
single-member BIA opinion is not the fair and considered judgment of the agency).
141. Affirmance Without Opinion, supra note 113, at 31464 (evidencing the Final Rule urges
the use of AWOs are not intended to “reflect an abbreviated review,” only the use of an “abbreviated
order”).
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will not change their minds about AWOs any time soon⎯especially after
Kisor.142
Immigration attorney and former Immigration Judge Jeffrey Chase
castigated the Final Rule for pressuring the BIA’s staff attorneys into issuing
AWOs for complex legal issues more appropriately handled by written
opinion—all to meet their monthly quotas.143 This essentially amounts to
“an abbreviated review of the case,” contrary to the DOJ’s promise.144
Chase further criticized that “through the new regulations, the Department
of Justice is essentially saying that, due to the crushing case load, just trust
that it is doing everything correctly, and defer to its two-sentence boilerplate
decisions without requiring further explanation of its reasoning.”145
Chase’s comments echo those made by the Court in Mead, where it
refused to grant Chevron deference to rulings released at a pace similar to the
BIA.146 This indicates that, despite EOIR’s former efforts to “reclaim”
Chevron deference, the Final Rule fails to provide a means for guaranteed
judicial review.147 Additionally⎯assuming it is true the BIA’s staff
attorneys are foregoing written opinions on complex legal issues to meet a
quota⎯any regulatory interpretations resulting from this practice may be
found to constitute “convenient litigating position[s]” unworthy of Auer
deference.148

142. See Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Deference is earned; it is not a
birthright. Repeated egregious failures of the Immigration Court and the Board to exercise care . . .
can be understood, but not excused, as consequences of a crushing workload[.]”); Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019) (applying Auer deference).
143. Jeffrey S. Chase, EOIR’s Troubling New Regulations, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON
IMMIGR. L. (July 5, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/7/5/eoirs-troubling-new-reg
ulations [https://perma.cc/9BP6-CCDJ].
144. Id. (citing Kadia, 501 F.3d at 820).
145. Id.
146. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001) (“Any suggestion that rulings
intended to have the force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46
scattered offices is simply self-refuting.”); see Chase, supra note 143 (“The BIA has certainly not earned
the deference the Department of Justice believes it deserves based on the regulatory presumption.”).
147. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel
Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 34654, 34661 (June 18, 2008).
148. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142
(2012)).
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C. The (Non)Interchangeability of Chevron versus Auer
Notably, in its 2002 amendments, the DOJ intentionally allowed for panel
decisions to “establish precedent construing the means of laws, regulations,
or procedure”⎯explicitly including both Chevron steps.149
However, immigration appeals also implicate regulatory interpretation
challenges, which are not intended to be analyzed per Chevron’s two-part
test.150 Because Auer is considerably more elusive than Chevron, and
because statutory interpretation issues are more commonplace, the body of
Auer cases in immigration is significantly smaller. Even the Court’s opinion
in Kisor analogized the two doctrines when reiterating Auer’s scope,151
perhaps due to the Petitioner’s argument that Chevron supported the need to
overrule Auer.152 However, Chief Justice Roberts ended his opinion with
a reminder: “Issues surrounding judicial deference to agency interpretations
of their own regulations are distinct from those raised in connection with
judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by
Congress.”153
Given this clarification, immigration attorneys should be especially
vigilant about “fram[ing] their arguments” in accordance with Kisor’s
“narrow” elements.154
1.

Chevron and Auer Deference as Applied in Immigration Cases

Being that judicial review of the BIA’s decisions is not limited to statutory
interpretation, immigration lawyers and adjudicators should be familiar with

149. See Procedural Reforms, supra note 112, at 54888 (intending the precedential authorities
of BIA panels to “encompass[ ] both the Chevron step II interpretive issues as well as the initial
Chevron step I interpretation”).
150. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see infra
Section VC1 (expanding upon the idea that Chevron is reserved for statutory interpretations, not
regulatory interpretations).
151. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013))
(“Under Auer, as under Chevron, the agency’s reading must fall ‘within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation.’”); see also id. at 2416 (citing Mead as a case “requiring an analogous though not identical
inquiry for Chevron deference”).
152. See Brief for Petitioner at 46, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18–15),
2019 WL 338890 (asserting Chevron “promotes, rather than skirts, notice-and-comment rulemaking”).
153. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, J., concurring in part) (clarifying the Chief Justice’s
opinion⎯“I do not regard the Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter question”).
154. Brent Owen, US District Courts Start Applying Kisor v. Wilkie; Is Auer Deference Now a “Paper
Tiger”?, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-district-courtsstart-applying-kisor-v-wilkie-auer-deference-now-paper-tiger [https://perma.cc/27AV-XDTZ].
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the distinction between Chevron155 and Auer.156
Auer⎯referred to as Chevron’s “less-famous doctrinal cousin”157⎯is
similar to Chevron in that both doctrines are equally potent formulations of
deference to agency interpretations.158 Additionally, the Court’s rationale
of the importance of applying Chevron to the Executive Branch is a familiar
one: immigration proceedings invoke a special expertise, particularly in
foreign relations.159 However, understanding the impact of Kisor on
appellate review of BIA decisions requires an understanding of when
Auer160 will be applied versus Chevron.161
The crucial distinction is that Chevron applies when an agency interprets a
statute, while Auer is reserved for the review of an agency’s interpretation of
its own regulations.162 Notably, while Chevron is a relatively simple two-prong
test, Auer’s multi-layered analysis is “harder to apply and less certain in its
application.”163 Even when the Court has made certain that it is
“mistake[n] to suppose that Auer is in any way a ‘logical corollary to
Chevron,’”164 this distinction has proven itself a source of confusion in the
circuit courts, at least when reviewing BIA decisions.165

155. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
156. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
157. Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221, 229 (5th Cir. 2019).
158. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (striking down speculation that Auer was the more generous of
doctrines); see also Forrest Gen. Hosp., 926 F.3d at 230 (“In practice, Auer deference mirrors Chevron
deference.”); contra Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing because “[t]he duration of the uncertainty produced by a vague regulation
need not be as long as the uncertainty produced by a vague statute[,]” the Auer doctrine is significantly
distinguishable from Chevron).
159. I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguilar, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999).
160. Auer, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
161. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
162. Compare Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (establishing deference for ambiguous regulations), with
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 866 (creating the test for deference of ambiguous statutes).
163. Kristen E. Hickman & Mark R. Thompson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 103, 107 (2019).
164. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2446 n.114 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Decker, 568 U.S. at 620
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
165. Or, Auer is ignored entirely. See Gomez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 2016)
(noting the total absence of an Auer argument in a dispute over the interpretation of a regulation); see
also Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 2014) (Wallace, J., concurring) (admonishing the creation
of “an intracircuit split as to the type of deference owed” to agencies because of the confusion between
Auer and Chevron).
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Take, for instance, Chong Shin Chen v. Ashcroft.166 There, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed whether an AWO by the BIA violated streamlining regulations.167
That court held “a great deal of deference” was owed to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation unless “an alternative reading is
compelled by the regulation’s plain language.”168 It did not state the
streamlining regulation was ambiguous, but its analysis neglected the BIA’s
interpretation of the term “insubstantial” was necessarily a question of
ambiguity.169 As noted by the dissent, the court made no reference to Auer:
“I flag here an issue overlooked by the majority: the governing standard of
review. Not only does the majority fail to analyze and decide which standard
to adopt, but the majority also neglects to state explicitly which standard it
is applying.”170
More concerning—ignoring Auer is not unique to judicial review of
streamlining regulations. Before Kisor, some immigration respondents
struggled challenging their removal proceedings on regulatory interpretation
grounds due to confusion between Chevron and Auer. In the Second Circuit
case Linares Huarcaya v. Mukasey,171 a respondent from Peru sought review
from the BIA when the IJ denied his application for adjustment of status.172
At the hearing level, the respondent was required to show that his visa
application was “approvable when filed” as mandated by regulation.173
Because Congress had extended that date two years after the respondent’s
petition, the IJ was required to determine whether the respondent was
“grandfathered” into the older, more restricted deadline by interpreting the
applicable regulation.174 Satisfying the adjustment of status requirements
according to the CFR demanded a “properly filed, meritorious in fact, and
non-frivolous” application.175 The IJ⎯applying the BIA’s interpretation
of the same regulation in a prior decision⎯denied the respondent’s
166. Chong Shin Chen v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1086.
169. Id.; see Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16 (2018)
(evidencing the ambiguity for Auer’s purposes means the regulation “risks depriving the regulated
community of adequate notice” of what is required, or the “requirements . . . are not clear”).
170. See Chong Shin Chen, 378 F.3d at 1090 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (contending “some
deferential standard clearly is in order here”) (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
171. Linares Huarcaya v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2008).
172. Id. at 226–27.
173. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R § 1245.10(a)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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application for failing to show the marriage upon which his application
relied was “entered into in good faith.”176 The BIA accepted the IJ’s
decision in an unpublished, non-precedential opinion.177
On appeal, the respondent claimed the BIA’s interpretation of the CFR
was undeserving of Chevron deference, specifically challenging the BIA’s
interpretations of the terms “meritorious in fact” and “non-frivolous.”178
The Second Circuit recognized the respondent’s error and asserted that Auer
deference was truly applicable: “In arguing for Chevron deference, Huarcaya
conflates the issue of whether the agency has legitimately interpreted a
congressional statute with whether the BIA has legitimately interpreted its own
regulations.”179
Similarly, in Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder,180 the Fifth Circuit reviewed the
BIA’s interpretation of “good moral character,” a factor in cancellation of
removal applications and defined in the INA.181 Because the INA calls for
statutory interpretation, it was indisputable that Chevron was the applicable
doctrine.182 However, in its statement of the law, the court declared Chevron
deference is afforded “to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutes and
regulations” for precedential decisions.183 According to the court, nonprecedential decisions were to be afforded Skidmore184 deference—another
administrative law doctrine of interpretation that is less deferential than
Chevron and just as obscure as Auer.185 Again, the distinction between
statutes and regulations was muddled, and the Auer precedent completely
disregarded.186
176. Id. at 227 (citing Matter of Huarcaya, No. A 79 078 179, 2007 WL 4707389 (B.I.A. Dec. 17,
2007)).
177. Id. at 227.
178. Id. at 227–28.
179. Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
180. Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2015).
181. Id. at 448; 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(B).
182. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
183. Rodriguez-Avalos, 788 F.3d at 449.
184. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
185. Rodriguez-Avalos, 788 F.3d at 449 n.8; see Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (considering the
“thoroughness evident in [the reviewing court’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade” in deciding whether to afford an agency deference of a statute); see also Jim Rossi, Respecting
Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105,
1110 (2001) (discussing how Chevron has overshadowed Skidmore deference despite Skidmore pre-dating
Chevron by almost forty years).
186. Although reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of a statute, the Second Circuit made a similar
statement of law in Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.
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In a later decision, the Fifth Circuit recognized this error; in Gomez v.
Lynch,187 the court commented that the absence of Auer analysis in the
government’s argument was certainly the result of the Rodriguez-Avalos
case.188 Although the Rodriguez-Avalos court was correct that Skidmore
applies to non-binding interpretations of statutes, the court cautioned that
stating this rule immediately after the prior misstatement was confusing.189
Even when courts are certain that Chevron is inapplicable, their holdings
do not always reflect the same certainty that Auer does. In Wangchuck v.
Department of Homeland Security,190 the Second Circuit stated the standard of
review of the BIA’s interpretations of immigration regulations was
“substantial deference.”191 Then, in Zhu v. Gonzales,192 the Fifth Circuit
similarly deferred to the BIA using substantial evidence, the standard of
review typically applied in the review of final agency decisions, instead of
interpretation of ambiguous regulations.193 There, the BIA’s interpretation
of regulations defining past persecution for asylum cases “support[ed]” the
court’s holding.194 This reflects another trend: not only were courts partial
to Chevron deference where an ambiguous regulation was at issue; at times,
both were ignored altogether. Concededly, the court never declared the
regulation in question was ambiguous, which may have influenced its
decision to withhold Auer from discussion. Still, it is telling that Auer was
not at least recognized.195
2004) (“With respect to questions of law, the agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers or
its own regulations is entitled to ‘substantial deference.’”) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
187. Gomez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2016).
188. Id. at 656.
189. See id. at 656–57 (suggesting the Skidmore comment, read “in context,” could mislead one
to believe the doctrine applies to “agency regulatory interpretations” (emphasis added)). Courts continue
to use the doctrines interchangeably, but the circuits are quicker to catch these errors thanks to the
refresher provided by Kisor. See, e.g., Perez v. Cuccinelli, 949 F.3d 865, 877 n.6 (4th Cir. 2020) (“The
district court ruled that USCIS’s interpretation of clause (i) is entitled to Chevron deference, as well as
deference under Auer . . . . As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, however, Auer deference
applies solely to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation and, even then, only in
narrow circumstances [citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019)] . . . . Auer deference cannot
apply here because the Agency Decisions did not invoke any regulation—or any authority
whatsoever—in pronouncing that clause (i) requires a permanent custody order.”).
190. Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2006).
191. Id. at 528 (quoting Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2006)).
192. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2007).
193. Id. at 594.
194. Id. at 600.
195. Compare id. (not referencing Auer at all), with Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 515–16
(4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, J., concurring) (analyzing Auer in the alternative).
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The concurring judge in Niang v. Gonzales196 shared the same sentiment.
In Niang, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s analysis of whether the
respondent satisfied her burden of demonstrating “persecution” as defined
by the CFR for her asylum application.197 The court reviewed the BIA’s
decision under the substantial evidence standard and held the respondent
could not demonstrate persecution “based on a fear of psychological harm
alone.”198
Justice Williams’s concurrence noted the majority failed to even address
the BIA’s interpretation of the regulation, considering Niang’s holding
“st[ood] in tension” with a prior BIA decision.199 For this very reason,
Justice Williams would have required an analysis of the BIA’s interpretations
of the INA and CFR under Chevron and Auer, respectively.200 The BIA, she
continued, had made no determination as to the ambiguity of either the INA
or CFR provisions, yet “the majority decline[d] to . . . even address[] the
BIA’s interpretation of [‘persecution’].”201
These cases exemplify the lack of Auer guidance in immigration law.
Legal scholars have recognized the absence of meaningful direction for Auer
generally and have various opinions as to why Auer has remained so
inconspicuous.202 Some argue the doctrine has been so from the start, since
Seminole Rock.203 After all, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Rock, with
“no indication . . . that a new doctrine of administrative law had just been
announced.”204 Regardless, Kisor’s holding has settled the question by
clearly reinforcing the applicability of the Auer doctrine.

196. Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007).
197. Id. at 509–10.
198. Id. at 512.
199. Id. at 515 (Williams, J., concurring) (citing Matter of C-Y-Z, 21 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1997)
(en banc)).
200. Niang, 492 F.3d at 515–16.
201. Id. at 516.
202. See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock,
65 EMORY L.J. 47, 63 (2015) (reviewing the unsung, often misunderstood, nature of Seminole Rock
deference). Knudsen and Wildermuth observed the confusion between Seminole Rock, Chevron, and
Skidmore deference but contended that mistakes in application have diminished since United States v.
Mead Corp., which clarified the difference between Chevron and Skidmore. See id. at 94–95 (citing United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236–38 (2001)) (stating Mead “has required lawyers and courts to
be much more careful in articulating what deference standard applies in a particular circumstance”).
203. Id. at 63.
204. Id.
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The Significance of Mistaking Auer for Chevron

Of course, one wonders if the mistaken interchanging of Chevron and Auer
is significant if the courts overlook the doctrines’ differences. The “import”
of Chevron deference in Kisor’s opinion has been described as “striking.”205
Although she distinguished the two doctrines, Justice Kagan still clarified
that “agency constructions of rules [do not] receive greater deference than
agency constructions of statutes,” implying it is no easier for a respondent
to prevail under Auer than under Chevron.206 As Justice Kagan reminded
both doctrines demand a reasonableness analysis.207
Yet, if Chevron and Auer are treated so similarly due to their overlap,
analyzing Chevron trends in immigration may indicate future trends of Auer
deference now that Kisor has rejuvenated Auer’s place in the administrative
state.208 For example, the Kisor Court faced the question of whether the
VA Board’s rulings—tens of thousands of which are not precedential—are
representative of the VA’s fair and considered judgment. Although the
Court left this exact question to be resolved by the government on remand,
Kisor cited Mead, colloquially recognized as “Chevron step-zero,”209 as an
example of the Court limiting the deferential value of large volumes of
opinions.210 In Mead, the Court elected to refuse Chevron deference where

205. Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach
Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 70 (2019); see also id. (“Moreover, the plurality opinion’s reasoning seems readily
applicable to Chevron, which the plurality frequently cited.”).
206. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019) (quoting Ohio Dep’t of Medicaid v. Price,
864 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2017)).
207. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416; see Evan Bernick, Auer is Dead; Long Live Auer, YALE J. ON REG.
(June 28, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/auer-is-dead-long-live-auer-by-evan-bernick/ [https:/
/perma.cc/3RMW-UVU9] (citing Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011)) (evidencing the idea
that Justice Kagan played a role in identifying Chevron’s second step “with hard-look review,” but did
not apply the same step to Auer in Kisor).
208. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 591 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(“What we said in a case involving an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations applies equally, in
my view, to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute[.]”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
257 (2006) (explaining that according to the “anti-parroting” doctrine, a regulation that “does little
more than restate the terms of the statute itself” is to be analyzed under Chevron, not Auer); see id at 278
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (coining the “anti-parroting” phrase).
209. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 211–13 (2006) (analyzing Mead
as a component of the Chevron “Step Zero Trilogy”).
210. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001)).
The two cases are distinguishable in that Mead concerned written interpretations, while the BIA issues
appellate decisions. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 222 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.8 (2000)) (describing the Secretary
of the Treasury’s role of issuing “tariff letters” for certain imports).
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classification rulings211 by the United States Customs Service were
“churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered
offices.”212 Even when the interpretation in question was found in a letter
from Headquarters with “developed reasoning,” the Court refused to treat
the letter as any more deserving of deference.213
Similarly, the BIA churns out a sizeable amount of cases each year—
enough to inspire the streamlining mechanism in the first place.214 In the
2019 fiscal year alone, EOIR reported that 54,092 appeals were filed and
19,449 were completed, yet a staggering 65,201 appeals remained
pending.215 This is the largest amount of pending cases remaining at the
end of a fiscal year in ten years—twice the amount left at the end of 2018.216
More importantly, the BIA has completed nearly twice as many appeals as
the ten-thousand per year suggested by Mead.217
Pre-Kisor, some circuit courts believed less deference should be afforded
to the BIA’s streamlined decisions.218 The Ninth Circuit once held “the
nature of [a] one-member, non-precedential, BIA order—one that does not
explain its reasoning—‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question.’”219 For example, the Rodriguez-Avalos
case relied on precedent to hold BIA panel interpretations of statutes are
granted only Skidmore deference, which is invoked for an agency’s statutory
interpretation “lacking the force of law.”220 Yet, even the BIA’s new
regulations, which expand the potential for issuing precedent and thus the
211. Mead, 533 U.S. at 222 n.1 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(d)(1) (2000)) (defining “ruling” in its
context as “a written statement . . . that interprets and applies the provisions of the Customs and related
laws to a specific set of facts”).
212. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
213. Id. at 234.
214. See Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency
Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1067, 1111 (2018) (reporting the BIA’s massive caseload affords members
“only 7–10 minutes for the average case”—less time than Administrative Law Judges and Federal
judges have to review cases).
215. Case Appeals Filed, Completed, and Pending, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. ADJUDICATION
STAT. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1198906/download [https://perma.
cc/4JHG-BA3J].
216. Id.
217. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
218. See, e.g., Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 532 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding the court will
not afford Auer deference to single-member, unwritten opinion, similar to how the court does not
afford Chevron deference to such decisions when they interpret an ambiguous statute).
219. Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
220. Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 444, 449 n.8 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing RodriguezBenitez v. Holder, 763 F.3d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2014)); Sunstein, supra note 210, at 211.
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potential for issuing regulatory interpretations with the “force of law,” do
not promise certain deference in light of Kisor’s “cabined . . . scope.”221
D. Auer and the Attorney General’s Certification Authority
There has yet to be a significant number of immigration cases focused on
regulatory interpretation since Kisor. However, before Kisor, the Supreme
Court issued Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation222 and elaborated
on the concept of an agency’s “fair and considered judgment” as applicable
to Auer deference.223 There, the Court refused to defer to the Department
of Labor’s interpretation of its own regulation contained within an amicus
brief, despite the fact the Auer Court itself deferred to a similar
interpretation.224 SmithKline was distinguishable, the Court reasoned,
because deferring to the instant interpretation would create unfair surprise
to the litigants, especially without notice-and-comment safeguards.225
Post-SmithKline, the Fifth Circuit scrutinized the BIA’s regulatory
interpretation under Auer’s fair-and-considered-judgment standard.226 The
court recognized the standard was “not . . . hard . . . to satisfy,” but will fail
where “inconsistencies . . . are sufficient reason to believe” that an opinion
is not representative of the agency’s fair and considered judgment.227 In
that instance, the BIA’s contrary interpretation of the same regulation
previously analyzed in a strikingly similar (though unpublished) case refused
Auer deference for failing to meet the “fair and considered judgment”
threshold.228
The fair-and-considered-judgment element of Auer’s analysis is further
complicated by the Attorney General’s role in the immigration appeals
process.229 As the head of the DOJ, the Attorney General maintains the
authority to establish certain BIA decisions as precedent.230 Establishing
221. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, supra note 113, at 31469
(amending the BIA’s ability to issue precedent); Sunstein, supra note 210, at 211; Kisor, 139 S. Ct.
at 2408.
222. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012).
223. Id. at 155.
224. Id. at 159.
225. Id. at 156–57.
226. Gomez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 652, 658 (5th Cir. 2016).
227. Id. at 657.
228. Id. at 656–57.
229. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2019) (codifying the Attorney General’s authorities regarding
immigration appeals).
230. Id. § 1003.1(g).
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precedent includes overruling past precedent, creating new standards, and
“confront[ing] . . . a split in circuit precedent.”231 Essentially, the Attorney
General possesses the same amount of control as any court, which has
inspired a fair amount of criticism from the circuits.232 Unlike a court that
is bound by precedent the majority of the time, the Attorney General is
under no obligation to defer to the BIA’s fact findings and legal
conclusions.233 Most significantly, in light of Kisor and the reaffirmed Auer
deference, the Attorney General bears the “primary responsibility [of]
construing ambiguous provisions in immigration laws.”234
This power, like the BIA’s streamlining regulations, has continuously
survived due process challenges.235 Particularly, the Attorney General’s
certification “contravene[es] . . . [the] right to a full and fair hearing by a
neutral adjudicator.”236 As bearing the “primary responsibility” of
regulatory interpretation, the Attorney General’s actions serve to voice a
holistic agency opinion: broadly speaking, the opinion of the DOJ; and
narrowly speaking, the opinion of the BIA.237 The following cases are
controversial examples of the Attorney General’s exercise of authority, one
of which already abrogated by a circuit court on Auer grounds.
1.

Matter of A-B-

Consider Matter of A-B-,238 an interim decision issued by then-Attorney
General Sessions in 2018 that revisited the “particular social group” (PSG)
element of certain asylum applications.239 In 2014, the BIA decided Matter
of A-R-C-G-240 and held “married women in Guatemala who are unable to
231. Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review
of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1772 (2010).
232. See Xian Tong Dong v. Holder, 696 F.3d 121, 124 (1st Cir. 2012) (describing the Attorney
General’s authority as “unfettered”).
233. See Matter of D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572, 575 (A.G. 2003) (“When I undertake review of such
decisions pursuant to a referral under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h), the delegated authorities of the IJ and BIA
are superseded and I am authorized to make the determination based on my own conclusions on the
facts and the law.”).
234. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 325 (A.G. 2018) (citing M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227,
230; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)).
235. See id. (expressing dissatisfaction in the lack of due process scrutiny).
236. See id. at 324 (stating the regulatory power of the Attorney General).
237. See Trice, supra note 232, at 1772 (“[T]he certification power is used most frequently to
announce new or changed legal rules or to advance policy goals of the Attorney General.”).
238. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
239. Id. at 316.
240. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
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leave their relationship” constituted a valid PSG for asylum seekers.241 The
facts in A-B- were similar to those in A-R-C-G-, except the respondent in
A-B-’s El-Salvadorian nationality.242 However, Sessions found several
flaws in A-R-C-G-, one being inconsistency with BIA precedent holding a
PSG may not be devised solely on the existence of harm to the applicant.243
In concluding A-R-C-G- was wrongly decided and “should not have been
issued as a precedential decision,” Attorney General Sessions vacated A-Band overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-, asserting victims of “private criminal
activity” are not sufferers by reason of belonging to a PSG.244
A-B- is a controversial example of the Attorney General self-referring
BIA decisions and altering precedent.245 Though there is nothing unlawful
about the Attorney General’s actions,246 they challenge the perceived
notions of due process and fairly provoke critics of the “ever-expanding
administrative state,” particularly in immigration.247 Critics speculate the
Attorney General’s certification powers are an avenue for furthering the
Executive’s political agenda.248
Although A-B- particularly implicated Chevron concerns, the case sparks
questioning as to whether Auer deference would be appropriate.249 As for
Chevron, Professor Jessica Senat scrutinized that Chevron deference is not
suitable in immigration law, and broadly speaking, “flexibility in the

241. Id. at 390.
242. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 319–20 (summarizing the underlying facts and
procedural history of A-B-).
243. Id. at 325 (citing Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007)).
244. Id.
245. See Jessica Senat, The Asylum Makeover: Chevron Deference, the Self-Referral and Review Authority,
35 TOURO L. REV. 867, 891 (2019) (“Sessions’ opinion is an example of why judicial deference may be
ill-fitted under the immigration context[.]”).
246. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (promulgating the Attorney General’s power to review BIA cases).
Compare Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through
the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 899–90 (2016) (“The Attorney General is
not usurping the authority of the Board when he reviews its decisions, but is exercising an authority
that has been given to him by Congress.”), with Senat, supra note 246, at 891 (arguing Sessions’ reversal
of A-B- demonstrates the dangers of judicial review in immigration).
247. Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring);
see Caroline Holiday, Making Domestic Violence Private Again: Referral Authority and Rights Rollback in Matter
of A-B-, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2145, 2147 (2019) (arguing Matter of A-B- demonstrates “the inherent danger
of the Attorney General’s unchecked referral authority”).
248. See Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV. 707,
759 (2019) (observing Attorney General Session’s “prosecutorial approach” to the asylum system).
249. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 326–27.
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administrative process cannot work in the context of immigration law.”250
Because the BIA historically has demonstrated internal inconsistency, Senat
states respondents applying for asylum do not stand a fair chance against
“changing standards” and “ambiguous language.”251 Additionally, critics
attack the Attorney General’s qualifications as minimal in immigration
expertise. Assuming this is true, the Attorney General’s lack of special
knowledge in immigration law would diminish the possibility of receiving
Auer deference for his or regulatory interpretations.252
However, the following case suggests Auer does not necessarily allow
agencies unfettered “flexibility.”253
E. Matter of Castro-Tum: Abrogated by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
Matter of Castro-Tum originated as an appeal by DHS, challenging an IJ’s
decision to administratively close proceedings for an unaccompanied minor
who did not appear at his hearing.254 DHS argued it had met its burden of
providing the minor adequate notice of hearing, and the BIA agreed.255
However, the BIA allowed all cases administratively closed at the time to
remain closed until either party to the case requested “recalendaring.”256
In 2018, the Attorney General used his certification authority to review
Matter of Castro-Tum257 and held IJs and the BIA cannot “suspend
indefinitely immigration proceedings by administrative closure,” limiting
administrative closure to cases where closure was once expressly authorized
through a “previous regulation or a previously judicially approved
settlement.”258 The BIA had previously interpreted regulations—which
delegated IJs to “regulate the course of the hearing” and take “appropriate
and necessary” action over cases—to include the authority to grant

250. Senat, supra note 246, at 882.
251. Id.
252. See Marouf, supra note 248, at 759 (discussing speculation surrounding the application of
Chevron to immigration).
253. Senat, supra note 246, at 882.
254. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (BIA 2018).
255. Id. at 293.
256. See id. at 292 (discussing the ambiguity of “administrative closure[s] in immigration
proceedings”).
257. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (BIA 2018).
258. Id. at 272.
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administrative closure even without the consent of both parties.259 Thus,
Attorney General Session’s Castro-Tum decision overruled over twenty years
of BIA precedent allowing IJs to administratively close cases.260
Castro-Tum rejected the concept that IJs have a “general authority” to
grant administrative closure, instead holding that previously existing
regulations specifically tailored for administrative closure were intended to
limit the circumstances under which it would be permissible.261
Castro-Tum instead intended to prevent IJs and the BIA from using
administrative closure as a convenient tool to pause the case and remove it
from the IJ’s active calendar to ease caseloads—a practice once backed by
precedent.262 Unsurprisingly, Castro-Tum was criticized as an overreach of
power and circumvention of notice-and-comment.263 The Attorney
General’s review of Castro-Tum called into question whether it is true Auer
provided “space . . . for [agency officials to] engage in opportunism . . . on
their own initiative.”264 In fairness, Castro-Tum was a lawful exercise of
opportunism, but opportunism no less.
Roughly one year later, Castro-Tum received its first negative treatment
from one circuit court. In the first Auer-based opinion since the Court
decided Kisor, the Fourth Circuit scrutinized the Attorney General’s
regulatory interpretation which formed the basis for his Castro-Tum
opinion.265
Originally, the Fourth Circuit found Auer deference to be unnecessary
because the regulation was unambiguous, as determined by both the
regulations’ plain language and its context in light of other “relevant
259. See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N 688, 691–94 (BIA 2012) (interpreting 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.10(b) and 1240.1(a)(1)(iv), (c) and establishing a balancing test to be used by IJs before granting
administrative closure).
260. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. at 274.
261. See id. at 276–77 (describing previously promulgated regulations allowing or mandating
administrative closure).
262. See Louisa Edzie, Matter of Castro-Tum: The Future of Administrative Closures and Due Process,
IMMIGR. & HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://lawblogs.uc.edu/ihrlr/2019/02/25/
matter-of-castro-tum-the-future-of-administrative-closures-and-due-process/ [https://perma.cc/FJ
M2-8KV8] (citing Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N 688, 692 (BIA 2012)).
263. See id. (summarizing the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.’s amicus brief
challenging Castro-Tum and arguing the decision violated due process).
264. Bernick, supra note 208.
265. See Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir. 2019) (applying Auer analysis to the
Attorney General’s interpretation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b)—instructing IJs “to resolve the questions
before them in a timely and impartial manner”—and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)—authorizing the BIA members
to “exercise their independent judgment and discretion” in resolving cases).
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regulations.”266
For these reasons, the court held Castro-Tum’s
interpretation erroneous.267 However, in the alternative, the court would
still not defer to the Attorney General’s interpretation in Castro-Tum based
on the last factor prescribed by Kisor: unfair surprise, which the court
designated as the “most important[]” factor of the analysis.268 Kisor
described unfair surprise as the consequence of “an agency substitut[ing]
one view of a rule for another” or “retroactive[ly] [imposing] liability on”
previously uncontested “longstanding conduct.”269 According to the
Fourth Circuit, Castro-Tum constituted unfair surprise because it departed
from the common practice of administrative closure and did not “give fair
warning to the . . . parties” of those cases to which Castro-Tum was
retroactively applied.270
Romero not only considered the interests of the IJs and BIA who had used
administrative closure to ease their caseloads—the court rebuked Castro-Tum
for “undermin[ing] the significant reliance interests such petitioners have
developed.”271 In conclusion, the court admonished that Castro-Tum
hampered the administrative process.272
Romero’s holding suggests two ideas. First, the court’s thorough analysis
is proof that the circuit courts will not blindly defer to agencies’ regulatory
interpretations following Kisor, as the courts once did, or were at least
encouraged to do.273 Although Romero is only binding in the Fourth Circuit,
the court’s decision suggests that not even an executive officer’s opinion,
issued in accordance with his own promulgations, is immune from

266. See id. at 292–93 (citing Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–15) (citing cases supporting the
interpretation of the word “any” in “any action . . . appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of
IJ and BIA cases to encompass administrative closure, not limited to previous promulgations); see also
id. at 293 (interpreting administrative closure as an “action” under the contested regulation); id.
(disagreeing with the Attorney General, holding the only limitation to administrative closure “is that
the circumstances be appropriate and necessary”).
267. Id. at 294.
268. See id. at 291–92 (citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417–18 (2019)).
269. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S.
142, 155–56 (2012)).
270. See Romero, 937 F.3d at 296 (quoting SmithKline, 567 U.S. at 155–56 (2012)). Castro-Tum’s
retroactive application necessitated reopening more than 330,000 cases. Id. at 297.
271. Id. at 296.
272. See id. (“[S]uch a sudden shift in longstanding agency interpretation frustrates mechanisms
for predictability that are supposed to be baked into the administrative process.”).
273. See Bernick, supra note 208 (reflecting on “the Federal Circuit . . . reflexive[ ] defer[ence] to
the Board of Veteran’s Appeals” leading up to Kisor).
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scrutiny.274 Regulatory interpretations can fail at any step of the Kisor
analysis,275 especially if the Attorney General’s opinion presents a “stark
departure” from agency policy.276 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit’s thorough
examination of the Attorney General’s pleads for deference is demonstrative
of Justice Kagan’s position that Auer “gives agencies their due, while also
allowing—indeed, obligating—courts to perform their reviewing and
restraining functions.”277 Second, Romero may have opened the door to
more appeals challenging decisions made by the Attorney General pursuant
to his certification authority.278
On Kisor’s first anniversary, the Seventh Circuit followed in the Fourth
Circuit’s footsteps and similarly rejected Castro-Tum in Meza Morales v.
Then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett rejected the government’s
Barr.279
argument that Castro-Tum provided a reasonable interpretation deserving of
Auer deference.280 The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the
regulation in question was unambiguous, but similarly held that assuming
ambiguity arguendo, deference would be unwarranted.281 While the Seventh
Circuit did not emphasize undue surprise as the Fourth Circuit did in Romero,
Justice Barrett provided a new warning to the Attorney General, which rings
true for the administrative state as a whole: “The Attorney General may
amend these rules through the proper procedures. But he may not, ‘under
the guise of interpreting a regulation, . . . create de facto a new regulation’ that
contradicts the one in place.”282

274. See id. (proposing, in comparison to Chevron, that “Auer is no longer ‘a revolutionary shift
of authority from the judiciary to the executive’”).
275. See Romero, 937 F.3d at 292 (finding Auer deference to the Attorney General’s
interpretation inappropriate because the regulation was determined unambiguous in the first step of
the analysis).
276. Id. at 297.
277. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019); see Romero, 937 F.3d at 292 (exercising the
court’s authority to “say what the law is” by declaring the meaning of the BIA’s regulation); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”).
278. For example, there is currently a circuit split as to whether the Attorney General may grant
waivers of inadmissibility to noncitizens seeking U visas from USCIS. See Meza Morales v. Barr,
973 F.3d 656, 659 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing cases from the eleventh, third, and ninth circuits).
279. See id. at 666 (“Castro-Tum’s interpretive arguments fail to convince us that administrative
closure is not plainly within an immigration judge’s authority to take ‘any action’ that is ‘appropriate
and necessary for the disposition of . . . cases.’”).
280. Id. at 664.
281. Id. at 667.
282. See id. (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
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In Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr,283 the Sixth Circuit officially created a circuit
split on the administrative closure issue. Citing Kisor, the court upheld
Castro-Tum as a proper interpretation of the CFR.284 However, in doing so,
the court appeared more concerned with the policy considerations against
administrative closures than whether the Attorney General’s interpretation
deserved Auer deference.285 Although the court disagreed with the Romero
court that the regulation was ambiguous, it continued to argue what exactly
renders an action “appropriate and necessary.”286 This itself is an
admission that the regulation is ambiguous, bolstered by the fact that two—
now three—circuit courts disagree as to what the regulation unambiguously
states.287 As noted by the dissent: “[O]ne does not need to open up a
dictionary in order to realize the capaciousness of [the] phrase . . .
‘appropriate and necessary.’”288
The circuits should continue the path of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
by providing due scrutiny to the Attorney General’s—and all immigration
agencies’—regulatory interpretations. Notably, because Romero is only
binding in the Fourth Circuit, and Meza in the Seventh, IJs and the BIA are
only allowed to use general administrative closure for cases arising within
their respective circuits.289 IJs in states with the largest backlogs like Texas,
California, and New York will continue confronting their caseloads without
general administrative closure as an option for respondents—at least until a
case like Romero appears in their respective circuits.290 Considering judicial
deference is intended to support administrative consistency, it would benefit
IJs and respondents to have support from the rest of the circuit courts to
administratively close cases regardless of its origin. These Castro-Tum cases
demonstrate why it is important not to underestimate the power of
regulatory interpretations; rejecting the Attorney General’s stark removals
283. Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020).
284. Id. at 462–63.
285. See id. at 471 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“[W]hether immigration courts have granted
administrative closure too frequently, and have failed to reopen administratively closed cases too often,
is of no significance to the question of whether Castro-Tum [was] wrongly held . . . .”).
286. Id. at 464.
287. Id. at 470–71 (Clay, J., dissenting) (noting in the dissent, the majority did not address the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Meza Morales).
288. See id. (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015)).
289. Edzie, supra note 263.
290. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ [https://perma.cc/TUS9-BA7S] (reporting the number of
pending cases and wait times in each immigration court).
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from settled expectations and attempts to create new rules via
“interpretation” could mean thousands of respondents, seeking lawful relief
from other agencies like USCIS, have a stronger opportunity to obtain it.291
Although Kisor precedent is only in its formative stages, Romero and Meza
prove that Kisor is reviving judicial scrutiny. The Court affirmed Auer
deference and recognized its appropriate place in the administrative state
while clarifying blind deference is inappropriate.292
VI. CONCLUSION
Immigration law has historically limited judicial review, yet this cannot
prevent the federal courts from exercising their role in “say[ing] what the
law is” when need be.293 Although the BIA’s regulations strive for judicial
deference, Kisor reminds agencies that deference is never guaranteed.294
Significantly, even the Attorney General cannot create a “stark departure”
from his agencies’ fair and considered judgment, even if doing so is lawful
under his own regulations.295
In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch belittled the Auer doctrine for
“transform[ing] . . . into a paper tiger.”296 Yet, the so-called crippled Auer
doctrine in Romero and Meza gave the circuit courts new fervor in challenging
the Attorney General’s interpretation in Castro-Tum.297 For a doctrine that
has been “cabined in its scope[,]” Auer’s new-and-improved analysis has
since raised the bar for immigration agencies—and the Attorney General
himself—while reviving the role of Article III courts.298 Instead of viewing
Kisor as a “pyrrhic victory” for the Auer doctrine, Kisor should be celebrated
291. See Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 472 (Clay, J., dissenting) (explaining how “administrative
closure is [essential] . . . if [respondents] appear eligible for an immigrant visa but unable to obtain a
provisional unlawful presence waiver”).
292. Ovalle v. Attorney General United States, 791 Fed. App’x 333, 334 (3d Cir. 2019)
(providing an example in an unpublished opinion that the Third Circuit abrogated precedent deferring
to the BIA’s regulatory interpretation that post-departure bars constituted jurisdictional limitations “of
its sua sponte authority.” The court further held that Kisor limited Auer deference to interpretations that
“implicate . . . [an agency’s] substantive expertise,’” and deferring to the BIA’s interpretation of its sua
sponte jurisdiction was inappropriate “[b]ecause . . . jurisdiction is precisely the kind of ‘interpretive
issue[ ] [that] fall[s] more naturally into [the federal courts’] bailiwick.”).
293. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
294. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019) (limiting Auer deference from “issues
[which] fall more naturally into a[n Article III] judge’s bailiwick.”).
295. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 297 (4th Cir. 2019).
296. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2426 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
297. See Romero, 937 F.3d at 297 (admonishing Castro-Tum for being “internally inconsistent”).
298. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408.
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for seeking the end of “reflexive deference” and championing the
importance of consistent regulatory interpretations.299 Ultimately, Auer is
perhaps now a “paper tiger”—but a paper tiger with bite.300

299. Yeatman, supra note 18.
300. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2426.
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